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BOOK REVIEW

Contracting Coercion? Rethinking the
Origins of Free Labor in Great Britain and
the United States
GUNTHER PECKt

When President George W. Bush recently invoked the
Taft-Hartley Act to order more than 10,500 west coast
dockworkers back to work for an eighty day cooling off
period, he stirred up old controversies about the landmark
antiunion labor law. One of the most heated and interesting
claims included a description of Taft-Hartley as a "slave
labor law," so named because of its power to compel
strikers back to work or risk criminal prosecution should
they continue striking.' While the comparison between
slavery and one of the foundations of modern labor law may
t Associate Professor, Department of History and Terry Sanford Institute of
Public Policy at Duke University. Many thanks to Laura Edwards for her
constructive feedback on this essay.
1. When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, CIO labor leader Phillip
Murray called it the "slave labor act." See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST
DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT: WALTER REUTHER AND THE FATE OF AMERICAN

LABOR 260-67 (1994). More recently, Taft-Hartley has again been connected to
slavery by organized labor and their allies. See, e.g., literature of the San
Francisco based Port Workers' Solidarity Committee of the International
Longshoreman's Union, which recently condemned Taft-Hartley as a "slave
labor law." Port Workers' Solidarity Committee, ILWU Local 10, A Call for

Action! National Labor Conference against Taft-Hartley and Union-Busting
(Dec. 7, 2002), at http://www.portsolidarity2002.org/pages/docpage/call.html
(last visited, Mar. 16, 2003).
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seem hyperbolic to some, the language used by workers in
assessing the Taft-Hartley law highlights how the idea of
slavery remains a potent way of explaining coercive
features of modern wage labor relations and the legal
system that defines the rules of engagement between
employers and employees.
Assessing the coercive content and significance of those
rules is a challenging endeavor. Invoking the history of
slavery to describe wage labor relations, after all, can
obscure rather than clarify precisely how and when
contracts and the law become coercive. A great place to
begin any investigation into the topic of contracts and
coercion is Robert J. Steinfeld's new book Coercion,
Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Century, in
which the author explores many of the surprising forms of
economic, contractual, and criminal coercion that haunted
the history of wage labor relations in Great Britain and the
United States throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.2 For lawyers and historians, Steinfeld's
new book proposes a fundamental rethinking of the
historical relationships between contract and freedom, one
that illuminates not only neglected dimensions of the past
but also the unstable terrain of freedom and coercion in the
present. Steinfeld's success in that endeavor stems less
from his historiographical claims than from his detailed
and impressive examination of the rules that governed the
making and unmaking of labor contracts among workers
and their employers in the nineteenth century. In the first
half of the essay I explore Steinfeld's accomplishments,
while in the second I consider the book's shortcomings,
focusing on how Steinfeld might have better utilized recent
historical scholarship to justify important omissions in his
narrative and to extend key claims about the relationship
between contracts, coercion, and free labor.
Steinfeld focuses the bulk of his book on the complex
rules that governed how and with what consequences
British workers breached their labor contracts in the 19th
century. He argues that the origins of what people today
deem free labor-the right to quit a job without criminal
penalties or other forms of non-pecuniary pressure such as
physical restraint or criminal punishment-did not emerge
2. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION,
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001).
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from market forces and the expansion of contractual social
relations in the early nineteenth century. Rather, the roots
of free wage labor relations reside, as Steinfeld writes, "in
the restrictions placed on freedom of contract by the social
and economic legislation adopted during the final quarter of
the century. '
Steinfeld uses court records, judicial opinions,
parliamentary debates, and data about criminal and civil
prosecutions of labor contract breaches between 1857 and
1873 to demonstrate that by modern definitions of free
labor, British workers were not "free" throughout much of
the 19th century. If they left their employers before the
completion of their stated contracts, they faced a variety of
"non-pecuniary" punishments including prison terms at
hard labor, large fines, and even whipping. In 1860, for
example, 11,938 British workers were prosecuted for
contract breach, many of them coal miners and iron
workers central to the nation's rapidly growing industrialization. Not all of these workers ended up in jail, but a large
majority received criminal convictions. "Of the 7,000-odd
convicted" in 1860, Steinfeld writes, "1,699 served a
sentence in the house of correction, 1,971 were fined, 3,380
received other punishments (wages abated and costs
assessed, in all likelihood), and one person was ordered
whipped. '
Steinfeld judiciously notes that such numbers do not
indicate how far the shadow of penal sanctions fell among
British workers. "For each actual prosecution," he writes,
"how many times did an employer threaten a worker with
prosecution should he quit or refuse to comply with
orders?"5 But Steinfeld persuasively suggests that penal
sanctions were used as one means of labor discipline by a
large cross-section of British employers, as prosecutions
dramatically spiked upward during flush moments in
Britain's trade cycle. When unemployment was high, by
contrast, prosecutions tailed off, though they never fell
below seven thousand a year between 1857 and 1873,
suggesting penal sanctions' endemic utility to a great many
employer-employee negotiations. Indeed, penal sanctions
were frequently used to punish strikers. As a result of the
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id. at 75.
5. Id. at 82.

204

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

1825 Anti-combination act, if British workers did not give
their employers one month notice of their intention to strike
and struck on short notice, they frequently faced penal
sanctions. Relying on the work of British historian D.C.
Woods, Steinfeld notes that fully thirty-eight percent of
criminal prosecutions in coal mining districts between 1858
and 1875 were for unlawful strike actions rather than for
unlawful quitting.6
Steinfeld is not the first scholar to note the prevalence
of these penal sanctions in British labor and legal history.
As Steinfeld's footnotes attest, his picture of British penal
sanctions rests squarely on the shoulders of D.C. Woods
and especially of historian Daphne Simon, who was the first
to spotlight the role of British workers in resisting and
changing the rules that governed how workers and
employers made and broke labor contracts.7 But Steinfeld's
originality rests on a broader revisionist assessment of free
labor ideology and of the many intrinsic connections
between market-driven changes in British society and
state-sanctioned forms of coercion. The emerging market of
"free contracts" in Britain did not inevitably or naturally
create free labor, Steinfeld contends, because "in important
respects free contract is an empty idea. A regime of free
contract only receives its content from a detailed set of
contract rules, and these rules cannot be deduced from any
abstract idea of contract."8
To prove that point, Steinfeld explores the remarkably
regressive story of Britain's allegedly free labor contract
rules, which expanded rather than limited the scope and
range of penal sanctions between 1823 and the 1860s. The
ability of magistrates to penalize growing numbers of
British workers derived from revisions of the Master and
Servant Acts, which ostensibly sought to create and enforce
a mutuality of interests between employers-the "masters"and their employees-"the servants." If an employer signed
a contract with a worker and then fired that person,
technically the worker could still collect wages on a
"minimum" number of days of employment. Such long-term
6. Id at 66 (citing D.C. Woods, The Operation of the Master and Servant Acts
in the Black Country, 1858-1875, 7 MIDLAND HIST. 102 (1982)).
7. See Daphne Simon, Master and Servant, in DEMOCRACY AND THE LABOUR
MOVEMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DONA TORR 160-63, 191 (John Saville ed.,
1954).
8. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 39.
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labor contracts could at least potentially function as a kind
of minimum wage provision for workers, a guaranteed
salary even in the downside of a trade cycle. Yet such
protections were rarely enforced against employers, as
judges became increasingly reluctant to obligate employers
to keep businesses running or to hire certain employees
when trade was slack.9 The result was that employers
"[had] it both ways, criminally enforcing long agreements
while at the same time disclaiming any responsibility for
finding work during the term of the contract" if fired or not
hired. These growing coercive powers were in no way
incompatible with market-generated contract freedoms,
according to Steinfeld, but were, to the contrary,
expressions of it. "[Olne of the inevitable consequences of
liberal readings" of the Master and Servant Acts, according
to Steinfeld, "was to extend criminal liability.""
If Steinfeld destabilizes traditional narratives of
nineteenth century legal and economic history, his story is
likewise filled with unanticipated consequences and
contingencies. British Parliament and the British Judiciary
constantly fought each other throughout the nineteenth
century over how to accommodate or stymie workers'
growing demands for reform. "Who could have foreseen,"
Steinfeld writes, "that common law courts and Parliament
would become adversaries with respect to the Master and
Servant Acts" or that "the courts would have authored a
pro-labor reading of the acts" in the 1840s, a short-lived
response to the Chartist movement's demands for reform. 2
The picture of the British state that emerges here is hardly
monolithic, but internally divided and open to competing
pressures from both workers and their employers, even
though most workers did not yet possess the vote before the
1860s. Perhaps more striking is Steinfeld's claim that penal
sanctions and lengthy contracts were not considered
controversial by many British workers until the 1860s.
"Lengthy contracts, per se, and the enforcement of such
contracts under master and servant laws, do not appear to
have been regarded by working people as the main
problem" during the 1850s and before. To the contrary,

9. Id. at 165.
10. Id. at 107 n.17.
11. Id. at 146.
12. Id. at 165.
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"[w]orkers often viewed such contracts as beneficial."13 Coal
miners in Durham, for example, continued demanding
annual contracts into the 1860s, even as Scottish miners
protested them and received much shorter "minute"
contracts in the late 1850s: a closer approximation to
current "free" wage labor rules. It would only be in the
1870s, when a group of Scottish miners and newly
enfranchised British workers succeeded in pressuring a
conservative government to reform the Master and Servant
Act, that long contracts and penal sanctions became
synonymous with unfair labor treatment and coercion to
British workers. As Liberal Party politician Robert Lowe
stated in 1875, annual work contracts "would be introducing a principle of slavery utterly inconsistent with the
genius of our laws and institutions" and "for which no
precedent or parallel could be found in the law of
England."14 But as Steinfeld noted, "Lowe was rewriting
English legal history, placing the final touches on the
modern myth of free labor" by distorting or simply ignoring
the recent past.1 5
By locating the origins of "modern" free labor in the
labor movement that successfully restricted employers'
contract freedoms and conveniently ignored its own recent
support of long contracts, Steinfeld seeks to raise questions
about how secure and natural our modern notions of free
labor are in the present. There are, Steinfeld claims, no
fixed distinctions or essential differences between pecuniary
and nonpecuniary means of enforcing labor contracts,
despite their importance in defining the perceived differences between free and unfree labor. Rather than
perceiving a binary distinction between "free" wage labor
and slavery, Steinfeld calls for historians and lawyers alike
to see that "the various kinds of pressures used in labor
relations are commensurable, differing mainly in degree,
and that economic pressures and nonpecuniary legal
pressures can be substituted for one another in many cases
and used interchangeably to accomplish similar goals."'"
Steinfeld seeks to exemplify those claims with his
13.
14.
1875)).
15.
16.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 215 (quoting HANSARD, PARL. DEB. CCXXV:col.659 (June 28,
Id. at 215.
Id. at 25.
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comparative exploration of wage contract rules in the
United States during the nineteenth century. In sharp
contrast to British workers in the same period, American
workers after 1830 experienced no civil or criminal
penalties for breaching a labor contract. This was due,
Steinfeld claims, to the existence of chattel slavery in the
United States and the vigorous efforts of northern wage
earners to abolish slavery-and any penal sanctions that
evoked it-in northern states where wage earning
proliferated after 1820. The lack of criminal or civil
penalties for contract breach even applied to the contract
laborers who had signed long work contracts in order to
come to the United States. The comparative freedom of
American workers did not reflect natural market forces or
the individual bargaining power of contract workers in a
labor scarce economy, according to Steinfeld, but was due
instead to political and moral forces: the strong movement
for abolition in northern states and the strength of a
revolutionary inheritance among working-class plebian
radicals who strenuously opposed any penal sanctions for
quitting."
But if American workers were freer from penal
sanctions than their British counterparts, they were
nonetheless coerced by the practice of wage forfeiture. If a
worker left his or her job before its full and absolute
completion, all unpaid wages were typically ceded to the
employer. Even while British courts strengthened civil
penalties for contract breaches in the 1820s, they also
passed laws outlawing wage forfeiture.
In the United
States, by contrast, employers used wage forfeiture as their
primary means of labor discipline and control. Many
American employers would like to have imposed stiffer
penalties for contract breach, Steinfeld maintains,
particularly those that imported workers under contract
before the practice became illegal in 1885.18 But labor
discipline did not depend on such contract remedies among
wage earners in the United States, even among African17. Id. at 35. On the emergence and power of working-class radicals during
the 1830s, see SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE
RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1985). For a critique of the relevance of
a republican inheritence to American workers, see PETER WAY, COMMON
LABOUR: WORKERS AND THE DIGGING OF NORTH AMERICAN CANALS, 1780-1860
(1993).
18. Id. at 31-32.
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American indentured servants in the North whose contracts
had originally sanctioned legal punishments for contract
breach. For these "free" black workers, many of them
female according to the court cases cited, wage forfeiture
rather than civil or criminal penalties sufficed to maintain
labor discipline.19
While Steinfeld acknowledges that criminal penalties
for contract breach could be more coercive than economic
ones, he does not conclude that all wage laborers in the
United States were somehow freer than their British
counterparts. Indeed, as Steinfeld asserts, not all wage
earners in the United States were necessarily free from
penal sanctions after 1830. Rather than explore precisely
how wage forfeiture worked to coerce American workers,
Steinfeld instead examines groups of workers who
continued to face penal sanctions after 1830: sailors who
served jail time if they quit before completing a particular
voyage;' sharecroppers in the U.S. south who faced a range
of nonpecuniary punishments if they did not fulfill their
work contracts;2' contract laborers in Hawaii who faced
legalized penal sanctions for contract breach after the
1890s;"2 and even loggers who violated local laws passed in
Maine, Minnesota, and Michigan in the early twentieth
century, known as false pretence statutes. When
lumberjacks in Maine quit their jobs in 1907 and walked
back to town, for example, "[r]ural justices of the peace
committed numerous men to jail or sent them back to the
woods to work out their contracts in the years following
passage of the act.0 3 Steinfeld uses these examples to
suggest that even in the comparatively "free" labor context
of the United States, workers' actual freedoms were
frequently at risk, dependent in large part on the rulings of
particular justices and their interpretations of the
Thirteenth Amendment which outlawed involuntary
servitude but not forms of "voluntary" servitude, however
onerous.
19. Id. at 262. For a more thorough examination of the evolution of labor
contract rules in the United States, see ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF
FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND
CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991).

20.
21.
22.
23.

STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 270-71.

Id. at 275.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 279.

2003]

CONTRACTING COERCION

209

In linking labor and legal history, Steinfeld seeks to
revise how both lawyers and historians view the historyand the present-of "free" wage labor relations. Indeed, he
frequently critiques lawyers and historians' failure to
identify the true origins of free wage labor in the labor
movement rather than in the marketplace. But many of
Steinfeld's critiques are not fully persuasive because of his
uneven engagement with a growing body of historical
scholarship that also challenges or qualifies conventional
narratives of free labor's origins and evolution in the
nineteenth century. The main U.S. historian that Steinfeld
discusses is Benno Schmidt, whose article on U.S. peonage
concluded, wrongly as Steinfeld shows, that criminal
prosecution for contract breach was unheard of in Britain
and that American peonage was a "stark and dubious
deviation from tradition."24 But Benno Schmidt's arguments
are hardly typical of U.S. historians currently working on
intersections between law and the labor movement.
Unmentioned and largely ignored in Steinfeld's oft-repeated
polemics are the works of critical legal studies scholars like
Christopher Tomlins, William Forbath, and Amy Dru
Stanley, or labor historians like myself, whose work
intersects with and amplifies Steinfeld's ideas about
contract coercion, and free labor in the nineteenth
century.
Steinfeld's narrative would have been more persuasive
and provocative, for example, had he explicitly considered
Amy Dru Stanley's analysis of the persistence of coercion
within nominally "free" wage labor relations in the United
States after the Civil War. Instead of focusing exclusively
on the penalties associated with labor contract breaches,
24. Id. at 235 (quoting Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The
Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part2: The Peonage Cases, 82
COLUM.L. REV. 705 (1982)).
25. See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993); LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
ESSAYS (Christopher Tomlins ed., 1992); William Forbath, The Ambiguities of
Free labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, Wis. L. REV. 787-809 (1985);
WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

(1991); Amy Dru Stanley, 'Beggars Can't Be Choosers': Compulsion and
Contract in Postbellum America, 78:4 J. AM. HIST. 1265-93 (March 1992); AMY
DRu STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); GUNTHER PECK,
REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE NORTH
AMERICAN WEST, 1880-1930 (2000).
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Stanley considers how a host of new local laws against
paupers and vagrants worked to coerce transient men and
women into employment through legal means, even after
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. Stanley links
these developments affecting wage earning to changes in
marriage contracts and sexual relations in the same period,
illuminating the particular legal dilemmas faced by female
wage earners. In so doing, Stanley raises topics and
questions that might have benefited Steinfeld's narrative
and analysis. Were women wage earners in Britain, for
example, more or less likely to receive criminal
punishments for contract breach? How did marital status,
for male and female wage earners respectively, affect the
application of the Master and Servant Acts? How did the
contractual options of British female and male wage
earners differ and how did their divergent experiences with
contracts shape their respective acceptance or rejection of
free labor ideology? What were the gendered dimensions of
the British labor movement's critique of the Master and
Servant Acts from the 1830s through the 1870s? In asking
such questions, Steinfeld need not have made marriage
contracts or gender relations central to his study. But he
could have used feminist legal history to make better use of
his evidence, while simultaneously strengthening his claim
that free labor was created out of political and social conflict
rather than from the "natural" workings of market
transactions .27
Steinfeld might likewise have located his examination
of the rules governing labor contract breach within a
broader context of labor mobility and labor market
transformation in the nineteenth century. The basic plot
line of Steinfeld's British case study considers how workers
acquired the right to quit, yet we get little sense of how
British workers actually exercised that right: how they
traveled between jobs and regions or were connected to
international labor markets in the nineteenth century. To
that end, Steinfeld might have made better use of the
insights and findings of my recent book, Reinventing Free
26. See Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of
Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471-500 (1988); and
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT, supra note 25.
27. For excellent feminist analyses of British legal and political history in
the 1850s and 1860s, see DEFINING THE VICTORIAN NATION: CLAss, RACE,
GENDER, AND THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 (Catherine Hall et al., eds., 2000).
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Labor. Like Steinfeld, I explore how and why coercion
survived and even proliferated among wage laborers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. But instead of
focusing on the legal precedents that defined and
constrained immigrant workers' freedom to quit, I consider
how geographic context and kinship ties shaped their
patterns of mobility and what the right to quit meant in
social practice. Wage forfeiture may have established labor
discipline among many workers in North American cities,
as Steinfeld claims, but for workers on the move in isolated
regions of the continent, the right to quit was hampered by
the practical difficulties of finding work after quitting a job
hundreds of miles from the nearest alternative.2 8 Labor
market entrepreneurs, whether padrones in the late 19th
and early 20th century, or "coyotes" in the present, gained
coercive power over migrant workers not so much from legal
statutes as from their ability to mediate legal and
geographic boundaries, capitalizing upon and commodifying
workers' right to quit.
Steinfeld's brief mention of
lumberjacks compelled to return to their jobs in Maine and
Michigan under false pretense statutes is fascinating, but a
very incomplete picture of the ways most rural workers
experienced and understood labor market coercion in the
early twentieth century. Steinfeld need not have made
vagrancy statutes, marriage law, or padrones the focus of
his study to have benefited from these recent scholarly
findings: discussing such work would have helped Steinfeld
locate his narrative of labor contract rules within its
broader geographic context.
Rather than frequently repeating his claim that
historians have failed to understand the correct origins of
free labor relations, Steinfeld might have asked how
pecuniary and nonpecuniary penalties actually did create a
continuum "of coercive pressures running from severe to
mild." ° How, precisely, are forms of economic coercion-the
threat of unemployment, low wages, and the likeinterchangeable with criminal penalties such as imprisonment or whipping for contract breach? How should one
compare punishments that, while equally effective in
creating labor discipline, have radically different signifi28. See PECK, supra note 25, at 16.
29. See id. at 46-8.
30.

STEINFELD,

supra note 2, at 25.
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cance to workers? Steinfeld's claim that employers have
used pecuniary and nonpecuniary forms of coercion
simultaneously is an important insight into the histories of
labor discipline and workers' control.3 But he provides few
examples of just how one might "grade," as it were, the
variety of coercive pressures that comprise a continuum of
coercion. Which risks to worker's health and bodies, for
example, are more coercive-having to sell one's body for sex
or having to sell one's labor power and future health as a
coal miner?32 While Steinfeld provides a definition of
coercive labor-any situation when "[o] ne person is placed in
a position to force another person to choose between labor
and other alternatives that are more disagreeable than the
labor itself'-it remains unclear as to what, if anything,
might be excluded from that definition.3 Would a corporate
executive who feels "compelled" by the Chairman of the
Board to give up his stock options or take a pay cut because
of disappointing earnings' estimates really be a victim of
economic coercion?
As Steinfeld correctly realizes, defining economic
coercion in absolute terms is a tricky task, as coercion and
freedom remain laden with conflicting ideological
assumptions and particular historical meanings.34 Key to
Steinfeld's argument is the role of ideology in framing the
creation and application of labor contract law. By
emphasizing the British labor movement's role in the repeal
of penal sanctions, Steinfeld demonstrates the importance
of political and ideological debate in the functioning and
transformation of labor market rules over time. And yet
Steinfeld provides surprisingly little ideological and social
context for British or American workers' campaigns to
secure free labor on their own terms. If specific references
to the scholarship of fellow labor and legal historians are
31. On the history of workers' struggles to exercise control over production
processes, see DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN
THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES (1979).
32. On the historical connections between wage labor and sexual labor, see
PAMELA HAAG, CONSENT: SEXUAL RIGHTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA
LIBERALISM 68-82 (1999); LAWRENCE GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN
WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 36-9 (1997); CHRISTINE
STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK, 1789-1860 (1986); and

SARAH DEUTSCH, WOMEN AND THE CITY: GENDER, SPACE, AND POWER IN BOSTON,

1870-1940 (2000).
33. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 16.
34. Id. at 20-1.
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rare in his book, so too are the words of workers
themselves. Wage earners emerge in Steinfeld's book as
occasional plaintiffs against the Master and Servant Acts or
as strikers, but his portrayal of their actions and
motivations rarely come into sharp or compelling focus.
How did struggles over the rules, and under the rules,
spark the creation
and transformation
of class
consciousness in Britain? Steinfeld gives us glimpses of a
very complex and interesting dialogue among workers,
including an account of different responses by British and
Scottish miners to the Master and Servant Acts and to long
contracts in the late 1850s and early 1860s.35 But Steinfeld
resorts to game theory rather than the workers' own
testimonies to explain their differing motives.36 Were
workers' differences reflective of fundamental ambivalence
toward the changing contract regimes available to them, as
both employers and some workers shifted from longer to
shorter contracts? Or were workers' differing demands part
of a more unified strategy, in which they sought advantage
in two quite distinct contract rule scenarios? Despite the
stated importance of British and American workers to his
larger argument, Steinfeld provides few insights into their
broader political motivations and affinities.
One consequence of Steinfeld's neglect of workers'
articulations about contract and free labor is that some of
his most important interpretive claims-that physical and
economic coercions have been historically interchangeableappear unsubstantiated. Steinfeld does not, for example,
demonstrate that physical and economic coercions were
interchangeable in the minds of workers, whether slave or
nominally "free" wage earners. While some British
employers in the 1850s may indeed have viewed long
contracts with criminal penalties and shorter "minute"
contracts without jail time as equivalent forms of labor
discipline, most British workers did not conflate the two.
Indeed, a great variety of wage workers in Great Britain
frequently described their working conditions as "wage
slavery" or "white slavery" in levying attacks against their
new bosses. Most of these rhetorical campaigns used the
language of slavery metaphorically, sometimes to privilege
the economic frustrations of white wage earners over black
35. Id. at 167-76.
36. Id. at 182.

214

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

chattel slaves and at other times to find common ground
against all slavery, black and white.37 Steinfeld notes these
complexities among wage workers in his introduction, but
insists that "even so, 'wage slavery' was considered 'free
labor' by nearly everyone," citing no workers in his footnote
but only Karl Marx's discussions of slavery in Capital.38 In
so doing, Steinfeld ironically condescends to the central
protagonists of his story: British workers whose activism in
the labor movement and aversion to forms of corporal
punishment from the 1830s onward helped establish the
foundations of modern forms of free labor.
One reason workers do not appear more prominently in
Steinfeld's narrative, perhaps, is that in adopting a
comparative national framework he has less time or space
for detailed examinations of the messy and complex world
views of workers' communities, the traditional terrain of
social and labor history.39 Steinfeld uses his comparative
framework to challenge time-honored assumptions about
the shape of American and British legal systems and labor
movements, arguing that the conventional wisdom about
labor relations in the world labor market-that of increasing
labor coercion in labor scarce peripheries-is overstated and
inaccurate. Labor coercion was far more prevalent in the
metropolis, Steinfeld contends, while labor on the
periphery, where a frontier of free land created labor
scarcity, made labor less bound by legal and criminal

37. See RICHARD OASTLER, WHITE SLAVERY, To THE HONORABLE THE
COMMONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, IN
PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED, THE HUMBLE PETITION OF HIS MAJESTY'S DUTIFUL
SUBJECTS THE UNDERSIGNED INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF NORWICH (1833). For a
discussion of white slavery, wage slavery, and their relationship to emerging
working-class radicalism in the United States, see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE
WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS

66-71 (1991).
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punishments." But in using the existence of "free" land in
the American West to explain the lack of penal sanctions in
the United States, Steinfeld unwittingly exhumed the ghost
of historian Frederick Jackson Turner, whose frontier
thesis explained why the United States was an exceptional
nation, one not racked by class conflict.41 Surely this was
not Steinfeld's intention, but the comparative method he
uses makes it difficult for him to explore distinctions
between and within each nation's working class.
Steinfeld's comparisons between England and the
United States would have been more effective had he
examined the transnational exchange and dialogue between
American and British jurists, politicians, and workers in
the nineteenth century, many of whom commented on each
other's laws and social relations." Had Steinfeld done so, he
might have revised some of his explanations for why
American labor contract breaches were not subject to penal
sanctions. If abolitionism in America played the key role in
eliminating penal sanctions, for example, why did no such
pressure emerge in Britain, where abolitionists were in fact
better organized in the 1820s and 1830s?" Moreover, what
40.

STEINFELD,

41. See

supra note 2, at 38.

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(1920). On the burdens and enduring shadow of Turner's ideas in Western
history, see PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK & RICHARD WHITE, THE FRONTIER IN
AMERICAN CULTURE: AN EXHIBITION AT THE NEW JERSEY LIBRARY, AUG. 26, 1994JAN. 7, 1995 (1994); and PATRICIA LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE
UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987). For a discussion of the
relationship between Turner's ideas and American labor history, see Gunther
Peck, In Search of an American Working Class: NationalFictions in the Making
of Western Labor History, MITTEILUNGSBLATT DES INSTITUTS

FUR SOZIALE

BEWEGUNGEN 29-46 (June 2001).
42. White slavery discourse was a particularly rich arena of transatlantic
exchange and commentary. Many of the exposes of white slavery that appeared
in both the United States and Great Britain between 1830 and 1860 assumed
the form of a cross-national commentary. Consider, for example, the writer
John C. Cobden, who condemned not only the atrocities of British industrialists,
but compared them to southern U.S. slaveholders. See JOHN C. COBDEN, THE
WHITE SLAVES OF ENGLAND: COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, WITH TWELVE

SPIRITED ILLUSTRATIONS (1853). For a fine model of a transnational approach to
political, legal, and social history in the United States and Europe in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC
CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998).

43. See OASTLER, supra note 37, at 1. As Oastler's popular broadsides and
speech-making indicate, Steinfeld erred in asserting there was no substantial
critique of coercive wage contracts and penal sanctions by workers in Great
Britain until the 1860s. The question becomes not whether a critique of contract
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influences did the United States' own emancipation of black
slaves have upon British debates about penal sanctions in
the early 1860s? The coincident timing of black
emancipation in the United States and white workers'
"emancipation" in Britain between 1863 and 1865 may have
been accidental, but one wonders how British workers were
influenced by the American Civil War and the emancipation
of three million African-American slaves. Did African
Americans' successful efforts to transform the Civil War
into a war for their own liberation embolden British and
Scottish workers to demand their own freedoms and rights?
An exploration of the rich transnational dialogue between
workers and their political representatives in both
countries would have enriched and complicated Steinfeld's
argument about the role of ideology in shaping the forms
and functions of wage contract law on both sides of the
Atlantic.
As Steinfeld correctly realizes, the extent to which any
wage earner is coerced depends on a great variety of
interlocking factors in specific historical contexts, including
not simply the particular workplace rules governing
quitting, but also how much money a worker may have
saved, how far away from home he or she might be, his or
her relations/obligations to family members, their ability to
speak the native language and the like. Much of the
"freedom" and coercion that illegal immigrants to and from
North America have historically confronted do indeed hinge
on the contract rules that Steinfeld historicizes here. But
many of the modern labor relationships described as
slavery today-debt peons working in isolated rural labor
camps, immigrants transported in windowless and
unheated ship cargo containers, or prostitutes forcibly
transported across national boundaries-hinge not on legal
labor contracts but on the constraints that isolation, gender
ideologies, racial prejudice, and transnational mobility
impose on migrant workers." For Steinfeld, the political
freedom existed before 1860 in Britain, but why was it unsuccessful in changing
the Master and Servant Acts prior to the 1860s? And second, what happened to
the radical critique of contract that men like Oastler and others articulated
thirty years before British legislators enacted a liberal revision of the Master
and Servant law? On Oastler's campaigns in the 1830s and subsequent
prominence as a Chartist, see EDWARD P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE
ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 146-47 (1963).

44. See
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battles surrounding the right to quit have been primarily
constituted by struggles over and under the legal rules that
govern formal wage contracts. But Steinfeld devotes little
analytical or narrative space to the shadows of those rules
or to the broader topic of workers' mobility, whether
between jobs or between regions, that shaped the practice,
meaning, and legal expression of wage labor relations in
both nations. Steinfeld's deficiency here is not, as some
critics of critical legal studies have suggested, having gone
too far in locating the law and its history in its social
context, thereby ignoring legal precedent and judge made
law.45 To the contrary, Steinfeld has not gone far enough in
locating the laws of labor contract breach within their
broader social, geographic, and cultural contexts.
Had Steinfeld linked the story of workers' right to quit
to the broader political struggles created by transnational
labor mobility, he might have had more to say about the
origins and proliferation of contemporary forms of bondage
that hinge on transnational migrations.46 That said, the
growing proliferation of coercive labor relationships
associated with globalization highlight why Steinfeld's
history of labor contract rules in the 19th century is timely
and important. By demonstrating that political and moral
discourse rather than market driven "freedoms" were
central to the invention of modern practices of free labor,
Steinfeld has persuasively
challenged
conventional
assumptions about contract and freedom that still pervade
our perceptions of the history of "free" wage labor relations.
Indeed, although labor and legal historians may find
Steinfeld's historiographical claims less than startling, a
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& OBS., Mar. 13, 1994, at 1, 3; Deborah Sontag, Deaf Mexicans are Found
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SOCIAL
ISSUES
IN
UKRAINE
Oct.
4,
2001,
available
at

www.brama.com/issues/havrylenko.html (last visited, Mar. 16, 2003).
45. See Peter Karsten, 'Bottomed on Justice':A Reappraisalof CriticalLegal
Studies Scholarship Concerning Breaches of Labor Contracts by Quitting and
Firingin Britain and the U.S., 1630-1880, 34 J. AM. L. HIST. 213-261 (1990).
46. On the importance of race and geography in the functioning of the
American labor markets, see ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN
JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1985); DAVID
M. GORDON ET AL., SEGMENTED WORK, DIVIDED WORKERS: THE HISTORICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); and TOM SUGRUE, THE
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great many lawyers, law students, and historians will no
doubt find his revisionist narrative dramatically new and
provocative. If Steinfeld's history of wage contract rules is
any guide, future freedoms for wage workers will be won
not through the marketplace, but by expanding the power
of the state to limit employers' contract freedoms with their
employees. As Steinfeld's narrative suggests, some of those
rules will be written by employers and state actors, but
many others will be challenged and rewritten by workers,
who understand better than most how contracts and
freedom can be mutually supportive and mutually exclusive
in social practice. Whether laws in Britain and the United
States make wage contracts more liberatory or more
coercive will depend on the ability of workers and their
allies to shape the content and practice of wage contract
rules and the larger meanings of free labor and coercion
that govern their interpretations.

